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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 19-2217 
 
_____________ 
 
JASON MOSTAFA ALI, 
                               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WOODBRIDGE TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
WOODBRIDGE BOARD OF EDUCATION; GLENN 
LOTTMAN, individually and in his official capacity as 
Principal; ROBERT ZEGA, individually and in his official 
capacity as Superintendent of Schools, JOHN DOES 1-10, 
fictitious designations 
 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-17-cv-02210) 
District Judge: Hon. Madeline C. Arleo 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 14, 2020 
______________ 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 At times, there are nuances that arise from history that 
create equivocation in analyzing how, why, and when certain 
historic events have occurred.  There are no nuances to be 
discerned regarding the Holocaust.  It is a historic fact.  That 
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tragic event in human history along with the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks lie at the center of this matter. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Mostafa Ali is of Egyptian 
descent and identifies as a non-practicing Muslim.  He alleges 
he was wrongfully terminated from his high school teaching 
position on the basis of his race, ethnicity, and religion.  
Although Ali’s deposition testimony states that his supervisor 
made some disparaging remarks about Ali’s race, Ali is not 
able to show that his teaching anti-Semitic views to his 
students was a pretext for discrimination that led to his 
termination.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Mostafa Ali was employed as 
a non-tenured history teacher at Woodbridge High School from 
September 2015 to September 2016.  In May 2016, History 
Department Supervisor Matthew Connelly received internal 
complaints about Ali’s instruction on the Holocaust.  One 
English teacher reported to Connelly that “her students were 
questioning historical accounts of the Holocaust, opining that 
‘Hitler didn’t hate the Jews,’ that statistics on the death counts 
were ‘exaggerated’ and that [the students] ‘got the information 
from their world history teacher, Mr. Ali.’”  App. 109.  
Students’ written assignments confirmed the English teacher’s 
accounts.  One student wrote in a paper submitted to Ali’s class 
that “Adolf Hitler . . . is looked at as a bad guy but in reality 
brought Germany out of its great depression.”  App. 110.  
Another of Ali’s students expressed a belief that “what they 
claim happened in the concentration camps did not really 
happen” and that “Jews . . . had a much easier and more 
enjoyable life in the camps.”  App. 6.   
 Around the same time, Ali had prepared and presented 
a lesson on the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001.  The lesson plan, which Connelly had approved, required 
students to read certain online articles translated by the Middle 
Eastern Media Research Institute (“MEMRI”).  Ali posted 
links to these articles on a school-sponsored website so 
students could access them.  The linked articles were entitled, 
“Article in Saudi Daily: U.S. Planned, Carried Out 9/11 
Attacks—But Blames Others for Them” and “Egyptian Daily: 
U.S. Planning 9/11 Style Attack Using ISIS in Early 2015—
Like it Did Using Al-Qaeda in 2001.”  App. 9.  The MEMRI 
articles also contained links to other articles and video clips, 
including a link to an article titled “Saudi Scholar Abdailah Al-
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Yahya: The Jews are Like a Cancer, Woe to the World if they 
Become Strong.”  Id.   
 On September 28, 2016, a television reporter questioned 
Woodbridge High School Principal Glenn Lottman about the 
links Ali had posted on the school’s website.  The same news 
station also questioned Superintendent of Woodbridge Schools 
Robert Zega about the articles.  Zega responded, among other 
things, that the School District would investigate the matter 
and “if warranted . . . the teacher [would] be disciplined 
severely.”  Id.   
 That same day, Lottman directed Ali to remove the 
MEMRI links from the school’s website and sent Ali home.  
The following morning, Ali met with Zega, Lottman, and 
Connelly.  At the conclusion of the meeting, Ali was given a 
letter advising him that his employment was terminated 
effective that day.  The Board of Education approved Ali’s 
termination at its next meeting.   
 In March 2017, Ali filed a fifteen-count complaint in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey against Woodbridge Township 
Board of Education, Woodbridge Township School District, 
Zega, and Lottman (collectively, “Defendants”).  He alleged 
that during his employment, Lottman referred to him as 
“Mufasa” or “Mufasa Ali” based on Ali’s middle name, 
Mostafa, and in reference to a character from the Lion King.  
App. 11.  Ali also stated that Lottman once asked Ali if “they 
had computers in Egypt” and had greeted Ali on two occasions 
with “Hey Arabia Nights” and “Hey, Big Egypt.”  Id.  Ali 
further alleged that other teachers’ characterizations of him as 
“anti-Semitic,” “unpatriotic,” and a “conspiracy theorist” were 
related to these disparaging comments regarding Ali’s 
ethnicity.  Id.  He also stated that Zega, Lottman, and Connelly 
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made similar remarks about his ethnicity during the meetings 
that occurred on September 28 and 29, 2016, resulting in Ali’s 
termination. 
 Based on these allegations, Ali claims that Defendants 
violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(“NJLAD”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by terminating his 
employment on the basis of race, religion, or perceived 
religion, and contends that Defendants violated the NJLAD by 
subjecting him to a hostile work environment.  Ali also 
maintains that Defendants violated his rights to free speech and 
academic freedom under the First Amendment and that 
Defendants made statements to the press that defamed him.1 
 Defendants removed the case to federal court and the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants on each of these claims.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction 
was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  “We have 
 
 1 The District Court also granted summary judgment in 
Defendants’ favor on Ali’s Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) claim.  The District Court 
denied summary judgment to Defendants on Ali’s New Jersey 
Open Public Meeting Act (“OPMA”) claim, but declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded the claim to 
New Jersey Superior Court for further proceedings.  Ali does 
not raise the COBRA claim or the OPMA claim on appeal. 
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment.”  Busch v. Marple 
Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Our review is plenary, and we apply the same standard 
as the District Court.  Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  Under that standard, summary judgment is 
appropriate only if, construed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the record shows that there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  See Wharton v. Danberg, 854 
F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A fact is 
only material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under 
the governing law.  Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State 
Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 Ali appeals the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on his NJLAD and § 1981 
discrimination claims, NJLAD hostile work environment 
claim, NJLAD aiding and abetting claim, state and federal 
defamation claims, and his First Amendment claims.  Because 
Ali is unable to show that there is a genuine dispute of material 
fact to be resolved at trial, we will affirm the District Court. 
A. NJLAD Discrimination Claims and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 Claim 
 NJLAD makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge 
an employee on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and 
creed.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a).  Section 1981 of Title 42 
of the United States Code also prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.  See St. 
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Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987).  Claims 
brought under NJLAD and § 1981 are analyzed under the same 
framework.  See Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 
903, 906–07 (N.J. 1990). 
 Discrimination claims brought under both NJLAD and 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting framework.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 
205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff must 
establish “(1) that s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) 
s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to . . . retain; (3) 
s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action 
occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an 
inference of intentional discrimination”).  Once a plaintiff 
meets the initial burden of production of making out a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant-
employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons 
for the employment decision.  See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 
F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).  Finally, the burden of production 
shifts back to the plaintiff, who must show through direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason given is merely pretext and the protected status of the 
plaintiff was the determinative factor of the adverse 
employment action.  See Makky, 541 F.3d at 214–20.  
 The District Court held that Ali’s NJLAD and § 1981 
claims for discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or 
perceived religion could not survive summary judgment 
because Ali had not presented evidence raising a genuine 
dispute of material fact that Defendants’ reasons for Ali’s 
termination were pretext for discrimination.  We agree. 
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 Defendants proffered three non-discriminatory reasons 
for Ali’s termination: (1) Ali disseminated links to anti-Semitic 
online articles through the school’s official channels; (2) Ali 
expressed no remorse for this conduct; and (3) Ali’s history of 
teaching Holocaust denial theories to his students.  Ali testified 
in his deposition that on September 9, 2016, Connelly had seen 
copies of the MEMRI articles containing anti-Semitic 
references included in his lesson plan and nevertheless 
approved the lesson plan.  He argues that Connelly’s approval 
casts doubt on the legitimacy of Defendants’ first rationale for 
terminating Ali.  But even if Connelly had permitted the 
inclusion of the MEMRI articles in the lesson plan, Connelly’s 
approval neither precluded Defendants from terminating Ali 
for posting links to anti-Semitic material nor does it raise an 
inference that Defendants’ rationale for termination is a pretext 
for discrimination.  Moreover, Zega’s statement to the reporter 
on September 28, 2016, the day before Ali’s termination, that 
“the teacher [would] be disciplined severely” shows that 
Defendants anticipated disciplining Ali based on Ali’s posting 
of the MEMRI links, not for purported discriminatory reasons. 
 Importantly, Ali has not presented any evidence to 
challenge the notion that Defendants’ second or third rationale 
was pretext, or that racial or religious discrimination more 
likely than not played a role in Defendants’ decision to 
terminate Ali’s employment.  Ali does not deny that he never 
expressly apologized for his conduct during the meeting with 
Lottman and Connelly.  Moreover, evidence such as the 
students’ assignments and emails to Ali and Ali’s deposition 
testimony show that Ali permitted conspiracy-theorist and 
Hitler-apologist presentations in his class and encouraged 
students to develop these opinions.  Indeed, Ali did not dispute 
that he presented sources containing the conspiracy-theorist 
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and Hitler-apologist views that appeared in his students’ work 
product. 
 Defendants presented at least two legitimate reasons for 
Ali’s termination.  Since Ali has not presented a genuine 
dispute of material fact that two of Defendants’ rationales were 
a pretext for discrimination, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment on both the NJLAD and § 1981 
discrimination claims. 
B. NJLAD Hostile Work Environment Claim 
 Under NJLAD, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work 
environment on the basis of race and national origin must show 
that the alleged conduct would not have occurred but for the 
employee’s race or national origin, and that the conduct is so 
“severe or pervasive” that a reasonable person in that situation 
would believe that the “conditions of employment are altered 
and the working environment is hostile or abusive.”  Taylor v. 
Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 688–89 (N.J. 1998) (citation omitted).  
This test “conforms to the standard for establishing workplace 
racial or gender harassment under federal Title VII law.”  Id. 
at 689. 
 Determining whether a work environment is hostile 
from the perspective of a reasonable person in that situation 
requires looking at the totality of the circumstances, including 
the frequency, severity, and nature of the subject conduct.  See 
Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 622 
(N.J. 2002); see also Taylor, 706 A.2d at 692 (noting the 
alleged discriminatory conduct must be viewed in context from 
the perspective of a reasonable person from the particular racial 
or ethnic background who is similarly situated to the plaintiff).  
Utterances that are merely offensive do not rise to the level of 
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unreasonably interfering with an employee’s job performance.  
See Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 860 A.2d 945, 955 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).  Moreover, it is “a rare and 
extreme case in which a single incident will be so severe that 
it would, from the perspective of a reasonable [person situated 
as the claimant], make the working environment hostile.”  
Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 455 (N.J. 1993). 
 At the outset, we find Ali’s claims that Zega, Lottman, 
and other teachers had called Ali anti-Semitic, unpatriotic, and 
a conspiracy theorist bear a tenuous relationship to Ali’s race.  
Since Ali has not shown that the other teachers would have 
made these remarks but for his race or national origin, this 
evidence fails the first prong of the NJLAD hostile work 
environment test.  See Shepherd, 803 A.2d at 625 (noting the 
plaintiff must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the impermissible conduct would not have occurred but for 
plaintiff’s protected status”) (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 
454).  
 However, the closer question is whether the alleged 
remarks that Lottman made prior to Ali’s termination meeting 
are sufficiently “severe or pervasive” that a reasonable person 
who is Muslim and of Egyptian descent would find the 
conditions of employment altered.  Viewing the facts in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, we nevertheless conclude that 
Ali has not presented evidence minimally necessary to form a 
hostile work environment claim. 
 Ali alleged that Lottman had greeted Ali on two 
occasions with “Hey Arabia Nights” and “Hey, Big Egypt,” 
made a comment to Ali regarding computers in Egypt, and 
referred to him as “Mufasa” or “Mufasa Ali” based on Ali’s 
middle name, Mostafa, and in reference to a character from the 
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Lion King.  App. 11.  Although these remarks are offensive, 
none of them rise to the level of severity that would alter 
working conditions.  There is no evidence that Lottman made 
these comments in the presence of other employees with “an 
attitude of prejudice that injects hostility and abuse into the 
working environment” or that any of them were as severe as 
the use of an unambiguous racial epithet.  See Castleberry v. 
STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the 
use of an unambiguous racial epithet by a supervisor, 
immediately followed by a threat of termination, created a 
hostile work environment); Taylor, 706 A.2d at 693 (finding 
sufficiently severe a defendant’s racist slur about and to a 
plaintiff-employee that was made in the presence of another 
supervisor and meant to humiliate the plaintiff).   
 Moreover, these were isolated incidents; Ali cannot 
show that Lottman’s remarks were so pervasive that they 
altered the working environment.  See Woods-Pirozzi v. 
Nabisco Foods, 675 A.2d 684, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1996) (concluding that sexist comments made “once or twice 
a week” over the course of one year was “pervasive enough to 
make a reasonable woman . . . believe that her work 
environment was hostile, abusive, intimidating, or offensive”).  
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Defendants on the NJLAD hostile work 
environment claim.2 
 
 2 Under NJLAD, it is unlawful for “any person, whether 
an employer or an employee . . . to aid, abet, [or] incite . . . the 
doing of any [unlawful discriminatory acts] or to attempt to do 
so.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e).  Having found that Ali has 
not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of 
fact as to his NJLAD discrimination or hostile work 
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C. Defamation, Libel, False Light/Invasion of Privacy 
Claims 
 A statement is defamatory when the statement harms 
the reputation of the plaintiff by hurting his image within his 
community and deterring others from associating with him.  
See Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 978–89 (N.J. 1994); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559.  To bring a 
defamation claim under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show: 
“(1) that defendants made a false and defamatory statement 
concerning [plaintiff]; (2) that the statement was 
communicated to another person (and not privileged); and (3) 
that defendants acted negligently or with actual malice.”  G.D. 
v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 310 (N.J. 2011).  Truth is therefore a 
defense in a defamation action.  Id.  In New Jersey, a 
defamatory statement can be expressed in both written and oral 
form.  See W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1153 (N.J. 2012). 
 Opinion statements are generally not defamatory 
because they reflect a person’s state of mind.  See Ward, 643 
A.2d at 979.  Determining if a statement is one of fact or 
opinion rests on the concept of verifiability, because if a 
statement cannot be proven true or false, it cannot be subject to 
liability.  See Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129, 1137 
(N.J. 1999). 
 Similarly, New Jersey recognizes “invasions of privacy 
involving publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false 
 
environment claims, Ali has no basis for his NJLAD aiding and 
abetting claim.  So, we will affirm the District Court on the 
aiding and abetting claim. 
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light before the public.”  Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 
289 (N.J. 1988).  Like defamation, “a fundamental requirement 
of the false light tort is that the disputed publicity be in fact 
false, or else ‘at least have the capacity to give rise to a false 
public impression as to the plaintiff.’”  Id. at 294 (citation 
omitted). 
 Ali asserts that several statements that Zega made 
during Zega’s interview with the reporter were defamatory.  
Here, we agree with the District Court that at least two of 
Zega’s comments that Ali refers to—that “[i]t’s upsetting . . . 
that somebody would . . . distribute [the conspiracy theory 
messages in the MEMRI articles]” and that there was “no 
[excuse]” for posting the MEMRI articles—are statements of 
opinion, which are not actionable as defamation or false 
light/invasion of privacy.  App. 207–08; see Lynch, 735 A.2d 
at 1137 (noting that “[l]oose, figurative or hyperbolic language 
is not likely to imply specific facts, and thus is not likely to be 
deemed actionable”).   
 Similarly, Zega’s comment that the posting of the 
MEMRI articles and the anti-Semitic statements and 9/11 
conspiracy theories contained in those articles were “not 
something that the district agrees with in any way” is not 
subject to liability for the same reasons.  App. 207–08.   
 To the extent that Ali argues that Connelly’s approval 
of the 9/11 lesson plan contradicts Zega’s statement, Ali has 
not presented evidence that Connelly represented the position 
of the District in approving Ali’s lesson plan.  In fact, 
Defendants’ decision to terminate Ali for posting the MEMRI 
articles is further evidence that the School District did not 
support the views presented in those articles.   
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 Finally, Zega’s affirmation that Defendants took “swift 
action” to remove the links and that “the teacher [would] be 
disciplined severely,” if warranted following an investigation, 
App. 207–08, is also not defamatory nor does it constitute false 
light/invasion of privacy because it is not false.  Indeed, 
Defendants acted quickly in disciplining the teacher at fault; 
the same day that the reporter approached Zega, Lottman 
ordered Ali to remove the MEMRI links from the school’s 
website and, following two meetings within two days, 
Defendants terminated Ali.  
 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court. 
 
D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Defamation Claim 
 A defamation suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may proceed 
“only if [the defamatory act] occurs in the course of or is 
accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or status 
guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.”  See Clark v. 
Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976)).  However, Ali 
alleges only damage to his reputation without any concurrent 
violation of his constitutional rights.  Since simple defamation 
alone is not a protected interest under the Due Process Clause, 
Ali cannot recover under § 1983.  See Boyanowski v. Capital 
Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 402–04 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that harms to a plaintiff’s future employment that flow 
from statements made by a former employer do not infringe 
upon a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause); 
see also Clark, 890 F.2d at 619. 
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E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983—First Amendment Claims 
 To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a 
public employee must show “(1) that the activity in question is 
protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the protected 
activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory 
action.”  See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Teachers do not have a protected First 
Amendment right to decide the content of their lessons or how 
the material should be presented to their students.  See Edwards 
v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that “a public university professor does not have a First 
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the 
classroom”); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 
1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[N]o court has found that teachers’ 
First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own 
curriculum or classroom management techniques in 
contravention of school policy or dictates.”).  
 Ali alleges that posting links to MEMRI articles 
containing “alternative views” on the 9/11 attacks is protected 
by the First Amendment.  But, based on our case law, Ali did 
not have a right to decide what would be taught in the 
classroom.  See Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491 (noting that 
decisions of how and what may be taught in the classroom 
belong to the public school and not the professor).  Hence, Ali 
posits insufficient evidence to withstand the grant of summary 
judgment on his First Amendment claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of 
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Defendants on all of Ali’s claims under NJLAD, § 1981, 
§ 1983, and defamation under state law. 
